The financial crisis in the last decades has become a common phenomenon. However, due to the process of globalization, financial markets' integration and their interdependency, financial crisis tend to evolve and gain not only regional but also global scale. In the context of financial market liberalization, globalization and internalization, the subsequences caused by financial risk and financial crises contagion become more visible and more severe. The financial crisis that originated in one region of the world through the rapid process of financial markets' globalization may spread worldwide and adversely affect other geographical regions, thus causing serious problems and disruption throughout the whole global financial system in the way of destabilizing it. Although it is not easy to forecast crises with high reliability, recently a lot of scientific researches were done on the analysis of financial crisis indicators. Early warning system of forthcoming crisis that uses a lot of different economical and financial indicators can indeed be a useful tool for preparation for the coming financial crisis, for evaluating subsequences of crisis to a country's economy and for assessing the impact of financial crisis future vulnerabilities. In the article all the financial crisis indicators which are presented in scientific literature are examined systemically and classified into four main groups. The main finding is that all the financial crisis indicators differ in their significance on financial crisis contagion. Moreover, all indicators and their observance simultaneously let both academics and politicians to evaluate the current economic situation and to determine if a country is struck by financial crisis or not. By using system of financial crisis indicators it could help to detect contagion at an earlier stage and help to prepare for the forthcoming crisis and to prevent from huge losses when the financial crisis hits. After all, the knowing of financial crisis contagion indicators system could be extremely valuable in developing appropriate financial risk management strategies.
Introduction
For a long time economists have believed that financial systems are fragile in the sense that small shocks can cause serious disruption. Research has focused on phenomena, such as bank runs, which affect the stability of individual institutions. Only recently there has been interest in the phenomenon of contagion, in which financial distress in one institution or one sector of the financial system spreads to other institutions or sectors. In the last decade internationalization and financial integration have increased the possibility of financial contagion among emerging and developed countries. Emerging markets have experienced a variety of financial crises over the past 20 years. The crises in Mexico in 1987, in South-East Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998 have provoked speculation that financial crises have spread from one country to another. These financial crises were initiated by episodes of 'local' turmoil but ultimately spilled over to markets with little or no economic linkages to those initial shocks. This has been described as contagion or interdependence. In scientific literature explaining financial crisis origin, contagion is describes as a phenomenon that occurs when a shock to one or a group of markets, countries, or institutions, spread to other markets, countries, or institutions. The recent financial crisis, which began in 2007 in the Unites States, has proven the existence of contagion phenomena once again. Without a clear understanding of financial contagion and the mechanisms through which it works, we can neither assess the problem nor design appropriate policy measures to control it.
A poor understanding of the transmission of economic and financial crises has in the past few years prompted a surge of interest in international economic integration and its relationship to international financial contagion. The Thus the main issue in scientific field is to analyze the process of financial contagion and to emphasize the main variables that could indicate financial crisis in the country. Active scientific discussion on the issues of analysis of financial crisis indicators is the purpose of the formulation of the objectives of this article.
The aim of this paper is to reveal the theoretical aspects of financial contagion mechanism in the global financial markets and to examine the variety of different indicators that help to indicate the first signs of forthcoming financial crisis.
Article objectives: to indicate the transmission mechanism and the main ways of financial crisis contagion, to investigate the diversity of leading indicators of financial crisis contagion and to present the early warning system consisted of different leading financial crisis indicators. Research methodology: in this article the systematic and comparative analysis of scientific literature is done, statistical data analysis is presented and various visualization techniques are used.
Mechanism of financial crisis contagion
A large body of empirical literature has focused on identifying economic and financial variables that prior to a crisis differ significantly between crisis and non-crisis countries. The objective of these studies is to provide an early indication of vulnerability to a currency, banking or sovereign debt crisis or, more ambitiously, to predict the likelihood that a country will experience such a crisis over a given time horizon. On the whole, the findings of this literature indicate that fundamentals represented by various macroeconomic variables do help to explain the incidence and transmission of crises. Their explanatory power, especially as regards the spread of crises, however, has tended to be low (Berg and Pattillo, 1998) . This has led researchers to broaden the scope of investigation from domestic macroeconomic fundamentals to other factors that may explain the temporal clustering of crises. These fall into several categories: common shocks, trade spillovers, and financial linkages. In addition, changes in investor sentiment, particularly with regard to macroeconomic and financial fundamentals, also play a role in inducing crises and their transmission across countries because economies with weaker fundamentals may be more vulnerable when others are suffering from crises.
Common or global shocks (which has also been called a "monsoonal effect") (Calvo et al., 1996; Masson, 1998), such as a rise in world interest rates, a slowdown in world aggregate demand, a decline in commodity prices, or changes in the bilateral exchange rates between the major world economies (particularly when other exchange rates are pegged to these major currencies) can play a major role in inducing pressures on the currencies of several countries simultaneously. In this case, the simultaneous occurrence of crises stems from the interaction of a common shock and domestic fundamentals. Instances of common shocks include the sharp increase in U.S. interest rates in the early 1980s, which was an important factor in the Latin American debt crisis, and the increase in world interest rates in 1994, which similarly may have played a role in the Mexican crisis of 1994-95. Also, the large appreciation of the dollar between 1995 and 1997 and the long-lasting slowdown in Japanese growth are thought to have contributed to the weakening of the external sector in several Southeast Asian countries.
When a country experiences a financial crisis marked by a significant depreciation of its currency, other countries may suffer from trade spillovers, owing to the improved price competitiveness of the crisis country Bordo, 2008) . If the exchange rate crash is accompanied, as is typically the case, by a downturn in economic activity and a compression of imports in the crisis country, the associated income effect would further depress the exports of trade partners. The price and income effects operate not only through direct bilateral trade linkages, but also through price competition and income repercussions in third markets. Furthermore, in view of the critical role played by expectations in financial markets, it is important to consider trade spillovers not only from countries that have already experienced an exchange rate crash, but also from those that might be subject to contagion effects. . The occurrence of a crisis in one or more countries might induce investors to rebalance their portfolios for risk management, liquidity, or other reasons. For instance, when a crisis breaks out in one country, investors who have positions in that country will usually want to reduce their now increased risk exposure and will sell assets whose returns are highly variable and positively correlated with those of the assets in the crisis country. Investors may also be induced to sell liquid assets for other reasons, such as when the reduced value of the assets of a crisis country gives rise to an immediate need to raise cash to meet margin calls (Goldfajn and Valdes, 1997; Kodres and Pritsker, 1999) . In addition, investors may sell assets that are highly represented in their portfolios simply because of their greater availability. Hence, a strong financial linkage with the major lender to a crisis country (in terms of being highly indebted to such a lender as well as being highly represented in the lender's portfolio) would increase the country's financial vulnerability (this has been labeled the common creditor argument by Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998 ; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1999, for a recent detailed empirical analysis of the role of the common creditor). Some countries, therefore, may experience capital outflows independently of their macroeconomic fundamentals, simply because their assets are viewed as relatively more risky (in the wake of a crisis elsewhere or because they are positively correlated with those of a crisis country), more liquid, or highly represented in the portfolio of creditors to the crisis country.
Shifts in investor sentiments might also play a role in the spread of crises. A crisis in one country can serve as a "wake-up call", inducing financial markets to reassess other countries' fundamentals (Goldstein, 1998). Countries with mediocre fundamentals or financial vulnerabilities may then be subject to contagion effects from a shift in market sentiment or increased risk aversion. If a currency crisis in one country generates fears of speculative attacks elsewhere, investors may expect to profit from speculating against currencies that they think other investors will also sell. The most promising targets are likely to be currencies that seem likely to be defended by official exchange market intervention or increases in interest rates, but that seem most likely eventually to collapse and yield speculative gains. The risk of a crisis precipitated by a sudden change in expectations is likely to be greater, the larger is the country's share of short-term obligations and the larger is the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, because the economy will then be more vulnerable to a run by a fairly modest share of lenders. Low levels of international reserves in relation to the stock of short-term external debt or the domestic banking sector's liabilities may therefore signal financial vulnerability. Countries with weak domestic banking systems may also be at risk because financial market participants may see this as a constraint on the monetary authorities' ability (and willingness) to raise interest rates in defense of the currency.
In order to explore the presence of financial contagion empirically, further various financial crisis contagion indicators should be observed and analyzed.
Financial crisis contagion indicators: theoretical aspect
With increasing globalization and financial integration, occurrence of financial crises and their transmission from one country to another become more and more arguable issue. The main field in the scientific literature among researches is how to determine whether a country is actually facing a crisis, isolated incidents, or just economic noise. Many scientists (Kaminsky et The empirical studies summarized in Table 1 share the idea that it is possible to identify a number of domestic and external macroeconomic fundamental indicators as the main determinants of a financial crisis. Some explanatory variables are exclusive for currency crises, banking crises or debt crises; others are informative for more than one type of crisis. The first two columns in the table list the indicator and a brief summary of its economic interpretation. The last column lists the reference. 
Real exchange rate
A measure for the change in international competitiveness and a proxy for over(under)valuation. Overvalued real exchange rate is expected to produce higher probability of financial crisis. 
Export growth
An indicator for a loss of competitiveness in international good market. Declining export growth may be caused by an overvalued domestic currency and hence a proxy for currency overvaluation. On the other hand, if export growth slows due to reasons unrelated to the exchange rate, this may cause devaluation pressure. In both cases, declining export growth can be a leading indicator for a sizeable devaluation. 
Terms of trade
Increases in terms of trade should strengthen a country's balance of payments position and hence lower the probability of crisis. Terms of trade deteriorations may precede currency crisis. Ratio of the current account to GDP A rise in this ratio is generally associated with large external capital inflows that are intermediated by the domestic financial system and could facilitate asset price and credit booms. Increases in the current account surplus are expected to indicate a diminished probability to devalue and thus to lower the probability of a crisis. 
Growth of foreign exchange reserves
Declining foreign reserves is a reliable indicator that a currency is under devaluation pressure. A drop in reserves is not necessarily followed by devaluation, central bank may be successful in defending a peg, spending large amounts of reserves in the process. On the other hand, most currency collapses are preceded by a period of increased efforts to defend the exchange rate, which are marked by declining foreign reserves. Total value of foreign reserves are also used as indicators of a country's financial difficulty dealing with debt repayment. Captures to what extent the liabilities of the banking system are backed by foreign reserves. In the event of a currency crisis, individuals may rush to convert their domestic currency deposits into foreign currency, so that this ratio captures the ability of the central bank to meet their demands. 
Domestic real interest rate
Real interest rate can be considered as proxy of financial liberalization, in which the liberalization process itself tends to lead to high real rates. High real interest rates signal a liquidity crunch or have been increased to fend off a speculative attack. 
Ratio of public debt to GDP
Higher indebtedness is expected to raise vulnerability to a reversal in capital inflows and hence to raise the probability of a crisis. 
Changes in stock prices
Burst of asset price bubbles often precede financial crises. 
Inflation rate
The inflation rate is likely to be associated with high nominal interest rates and may proxy macroeconomic mismanagement which adversely affects the economy and the banking system. 
OECD GDP growth
Higher foreign output growth should strengthen exports and thus reduce the probability of a crisis. As it can be seen from the indicators list in Table 1 , all the indicators are of macroeconomic development and external shocks. Worsening of these indicators affects the stability of financial system and may result in a financial crisis. All the indicators are selected by theoretical consideration as well as recent findings of empirical studies on financial crises. The indicators can be clustered into four major groups:
1. External: real exchange rates, export growth, import growth, terms of trade, ratio of the current account to GDP, the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves and growth of foreign exchange reserves.
2. Financial: M1 and M2 growth, M2 money multiplier, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, excess real M1 balances, domestic real interest rate, lending and deposit rate spread, commercial bank deposits, and the ratio of bank reserves to bank assets.
3. Domestic (real and public): the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP, the ratio of public debt to GDP, growth of industrial production, changes in stock prices, inflation rate, GDP per capita, and growth of national saving.
4. Global: growth of world oil prices, US interest rate and OECD GDP growth Seven variables are grouped as external sector indicators, five of which are related to the current account and two to the capital account. These variables are certainly affected not only by domestic economic conditions and policies, but also by global conditions such as fluctuations in the US dollar, international capital flows and commodity prices. The second group contains 16 indicators, nine financial indicators and seven domestic real and public sector variables that are partly or fully driven by economic policy. Finally, three global indicators reflect major economic shifts in industrial countries and movements of oil prices which may trigger a crisis. Some indicators are multiple crises indicators in the sense that the same indicator hints at more than one type of financial crises. However, it is not sure whether such a multiple crises indicator affects the probability of two or more types of financial crises simultaneously, or whether it triggers one type of crisis which in turn rolls over to a second type of crisis, and a third. Usually it is difficult to separate currency, banking and sovereign debt crisis. Often, these types of financial crisis are closely intertwined and escalate from one to another. For instance, a drop in international competitiveness may result in a currency crises as a result of which a banking crises evolves. Our model allows for one indicator to affect two or more types of crises. However, the rollover effect is not captured explicitly. Table 2 gives an overview of the empirical results of most of the papers on financial crises. The empirical papers deal with single crisis only and differ in the types of analysis: signal extraction models and qualitative response models. Also the time span and the frequency of the data and the number of countries included in the analysis differs. Some papers use a short time span and cover a lot of countries, especially Lanoie and Lemarbre (1996) , while others cover a longer time span at the expense of a smaller country coverage. Berg and Pattillo (1999) and Edison (2003) use the same set of currency crisis indicators as Kaminsky et al. (1998) apart from global economy indicators which are included to capture external shocks. All studies show that real exchange rates, export growth, and the ratio of M2 to international reserves are the most important indicators to explain the probability of currency crises.
Dermirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) consider the role of macroeconomic variables, deposit insurance and law enforcement in determining the likelihood of banking failure. They observe that the risk of a banking crisis becomes higher the lower output growth and the higher inflation, the domestic real interest rate, the ratio of M2 to international reserve, and domestic credit per GDP. Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) find that domestic credit booms and government fiscal balance are strongly associated with banking crises.
The most recent study on the probability of debt crises, Marchesi (2003) concludes that none of the indicators listed in Table 2 is significant. This result is not supported by Lanoie and Lemarbre (1996) . They observe that the lower the rate of growth of GDP per capita and the large external capital inflows, the higher the probability of debt rescheduling and debt crises.
Financial crisis contagion indicators: empirical aspect
According to the empirical studies (Caramazza et  On the external side, the appreciation of the real exchange rate during the three years prior to the onset of each financial crisis, a possibly proxy for loss of international price competitiveness and exchange rate misalignment, is almost 15 percentage points larger on average for crisis than for non-crisis emerging economies. For the industrial countries, the appreciation is not significantly different between crisis and noncrisis countries.
 The external current account deficit in the year before the crisis is also larger on average by over 2 percentage points of GDP in crisis than in non-crisis countries for both industrial and emerging market economies, which may further indicate poor trade competitiveness in the crisis countries.
 As a further indication of weak external performance, the growth of exports in relation to GDP in the three years before the crisis is also 11 percentage points lower on average for crisis than for non-crisis emerging market countries, while not significantly different for industrial countries. Other external sector variables, apart from short-term external debt in relation to total external debt, are insignificantly different between crisis and non-crisis countries.
 Evidence of pre-crisis domestic macroeconomic imbalances that have made a country vulnerable to financial market contagion include slow GDP growth in the three years prior to the crisis, a high unemployment rate and a banking crisis. Prior to the past financial crisis, GDP growth was on average 2 percentage points lower and unemployment rate 4 percentage points higher in crisis than in non-crisis industrial countries. The differences in output growth between crisis and non-crisis countries are smaller for the emerging market economies. Low output growth and high unemployment may be an indicator that external or domestic imbalances may become increasingly untenable or that governments will be unwilling to defend exchange rate arrangements by implementing policies, such as raising short-term interest rates that could slow down real activity even further.
 All of the industrial countries and a few emerging market economies that had a banking crisis in the year prior to a global currency crisis also suffered currency market pressure. Domestic imbalances in terms of large general government fiscal deficits or substantial monetary expansions, proxied by the growth of broad money (M2) to GDP, can fuel expectations of inflation and therefore lead to pressures on the currency. However, these variables are indistinguishable on average between crisis and non-crisis countries during the period before financial crisis.
 Trade linkages as measured by the implied appreciation of the real exchange rate and the implied decline of export market growth induced by crises in other countries are generally significantly different on average between crisis and non-crisis economies. The difference between crisis and non-crisis countries with respect to the implied slowdown in export market growth is greatest for the emerging market economies and weakest for the industrial countries in the term of financial crisis.
 Financial weaknesses or fragilities, proxied by the inadequacy of international reserves to cover speculative attacks, in crisis countries are significantly larger than in non-crisis ones. In particular, the ratio of short-term debt to international reserves in the year before crisis is almost 200 percentage points higher in emerging crisis economies compared with non-crisis economies. This indicates that these crisis economies were vulnerable to a change in investor sentiment in an unfriendly or illiquid external environment -potential source of financial contagion.
The ratio of broad money (M2) to international reserves is the inverse of the extent to which liquid domestic liabilities of the banking system are backed by foreign exchange reserves and thus is a measure of the banking system's ability to withstand currency pressures. For emerging market crisis economies, this ratio in the year before the crisis is 30 percentage point higher, on average, than in non-crisis economies. There are, however, no significant differences between crisis and non-crisis industrial countries.  Common credit financial market linkages seem to be very important in explaining differences between crisis and non-crisis emerging market economies. The common creditor is identified by the country that lent the most to the first country in crisis during the term of financial crisis. The common creditor variables -that is, the importance of the common creditor for the borrowing country and the importance of the borrowing country for the common creditor in the year prior to the crisis -are significantly higher in the crisis emerging market economies than in the non-crisis ones. On average, the common creditor holds a 10 percentage point higher share of the external bank liabilities of the crisis countries than of the non-crisis countries, whereas the average crisis country holds a 5 percentage point higher share of the external loan portfolio of the common creditor than the average non-crisis country. A variable indicating mutual importance, constructed by multiplying the two common creditor variables, is also almost always higher for crisis compared with non-crisis emerging market economies.
 The short term share of debt to BIS banks, a proxy for the maturity composition of bank liabilities, is also significantly higher in crisis than in non-crisis countries before the occurrence of financial crisis. However, the short term share of debt to BIS banks does not bear significant differences for other crises.
 Risk management factors are proxied by stock market variability and the stock market correlation with the stock market of the first crisis country. Although the stock market variability is not significant, the stock market correlation with the stock market of the first crisis country is significantly different for crisis and noncrisis countries. These results suggest potential market-linked transmission mechanisms for contagion, where creditors may rebalance their portfolios at the onset of a crisis for common creditor, liquidity, and risk management factors. If there are regional differences in primary creditor relationships or stock market correlations, these also help to explain the regional bunching of financial crises.
The results of empirical studies indicate that once we control for domestic and external fundamentals and trade spillovers, financial linkages and weaknesses play a significant role in explaining the spread of emerging market crises, while exchange rate regimes and capital controls do not seem to matter. Thus only a group of different indicators should be observed simultaneously in order to indicate contagion of financial crisis.
Conclusions
To summarize the analysis of financial crises crisis contagion indicators, the following conclusions can be made:
1. The problems induced by financial crises become more serious and significant in the context of the globalization and internationalization of financial markets. The financial crises in one region may adversely influence other regions in geographically different parts of the world, which could escalate and trigger problems in the whole global financial system.
2. Over the past two decades, financial market crises with similar features have occurred in different regions of the world. The idea that since countries are interconnected through trade linkages, a shock originating in one country can be transmitted and amplified because of the pattern of interconnections in the network has been provided in the scientific financial literature. Unstable cross-market linkages during a crisis are referred to as financial contagion.
3. There are a number of different theories why financial contagion can occur. Fundamental causes (including common shocks, trade linkages and certain financial linkages) and investors' behavior (including liquidity problems, incentive problems, informational asymmetries, market coordination problems, and investor reassessment) are the main reasons why the financial risk contagion appears.
4. Many scientists and researchers, when analyzing the phenomenon of financial risk contagion, agree that most crises include multiple financial contagion indicators and distinguish four different groups of indicators: external sector indicators, financial sector indicators, domestic real and public sector indicators and global economy indicators. All indicators and their observance simultaneously let both academics and politicians to evaluate the current economic situation and to determine if a country is struck by financial crisis or not.
5. Although the phenomenon of financial risk contagion has been extensively investigated in the financial literature, it has not been studied through computational intelligence techniques that could help to detect contagion at an earlier stage, hence recognizing financial crises with the potential to destabilize crossmarket linkages. In the real world, such information would be extremely valuable in developing appropriate risk management strategies.
6. Policy makers also need to understand the spillover effect when coordinating their efforts to alleviate the current crisis. For future research, it is important to better understand factors that may affect the dynamics of global interdependence, such as market imperfection, investors' sentiment, and information efficiency. The steps that could help to strengthen individual economies and the global financial system can be classified into three broad categories: better country policies, improved investor strategies, and stronger global frameworks.
